The paper considers a principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy where the supervisor is self-interested and able to manipulate information. The supervisor's self interest may motivate him to accept a bribe in exchange for a report that is overly favorable to the agent or to extort the agent by demanding payment for a favorable report to which the agent is fairly entitled. When attempting to extort the agent, the supervisor may become irrationally attached to his bargaining position, including threats that if carried out would incur a loss ex post; realizing this, the agent may accede to extortion. In spite of this possibility for strictly positive extortion payments, incentives are improved -in that the information rent is lowered -by reducing the bargaining power of the agent, relative to that of the supervisor. However, the expected cost of these payments -the corruption rent collected by the supervisor -is passed on to the principal through the agent's participation constraint, and this rent is lowered by increasing the agent's relative bargaining power. Thus there is a tradeoff between informational and corruption rents: Increasing the agent's relative bargaining power increases the information rent and decreases the corruption rent, and the overall effect on the value of the optimal contract tends to follow a simple rule: Strong supervisors are preferred when supervision is less effective, and strong agents are preferred when supervision is more effective.
Introduction
Two recent surveys are far from alone in demonstrating the prevalence of petty corruption in the everyday lives of many of the world's citizens and the staggering magnitude of the problem when payments are aggregated: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that one in two adults in Afghanistan paid at least one bribe to a public official in 2009, with payments totaling $2.5 billion -nearly a quarter of the country's licit GDP. Although payments are generically referred to as bribes, it is clear in these accounts that much of what transpires is extortion. In order to elicit "bribes," tax auditors threaten to disallow legitimate deductions and police officers threaten to overlook evidence of suspects' innocence.
Law enforcement, regulatory agencies, tax bureaus and other government bureaucracies feature prominently in these and other accounts of corruption.
3 Each of these institutions might be viewed as the middle rung of a supervisory hierarchy, justified in large part by its ability to overcome an informational asymmetry between top and bottom. Bribery and extortion in these settings -corruption that is information-basedcan be expected to alter incentives and drive a wedge between the nominal and real effects of institutions that greatly shape social interaction and economic activity.
The present paper offers a stylized analysis of these issues in a principal/supervisor/agent model with adverse selection. The agent has private information about his type, which makes it costly for the principal to implement an efficient allocation rule and brings up the familiar tradeoff between efficiency and 1 UNODC (2010) Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as Reported by the Victims. 2 Transparency International (2009) Global Corruption Barometer. World Bank Enterprise Surveys suggest that corruption is also pervasive at the firm level -much of which it would be understatement to call petty. 3 See also Klitgaard (1988) , Olken and Barron (2009), and Polgreen (2010) .
information rent. The supervisor is sometimes able to discover the agent's type, which typically makes supervision helpful to the principal. However, a supervisor who finds unfavorable information may collude with the agent and agree to make instead a favorable report in exchange for a bribe, and a supervisor who finds favorable information may extort the agent by threatening to suppress the information (i.e., threatening to frame the agent) unless the agent pays him to report truthfully.
The paper sets out to construct a model in which the principal may tolerate either bribery or extortion, or both, in equilibrium. Therefore, the determination of side transfers -bribes and extortion payments -is a key issue. In order to construct a tractable model, a simple Nash bargaining program, which allows for bargaining power to be unequally divided between the supervisor and the agent, is used to determine transfers. The supervisor is given an added advantage in cases where he has a choice of action if negotiations break down: Irrational actions are improbable but not impossible.
In particular, the supervisor may threaten to withhold a favorable report -even if actually doing so would require the supervisor to forego a reward -and the agent must be concerned about the small possibility that the supervisor is just crazy enough to do it.
A parameter is introduced to capture the degree of difficulty for the supervisor/agent coalition in manipulating information. The ease of manipulation, 1 − , is analogous to Laffont's (1990) index, , of the softness of the supervisor's information.
In law enforcement, might capture the availability of sophisticated forensic evidencee.g., the fraction of police labs that can type blood or match a bullet to a gun. In auditing, one might think of as the efficacy of auditing standards and 1 − as the probability that the supervisor/agent coalition finds a loophole it can exploit. 4
Contributions
The paper's main contribution to theory is to identify a tradeoff, with respect to the division of bargaining power between the supervisor and agent, between the standard information rent paid to the agent and the corruption rent paid to the supervisor through elicit bribes and extortion payments. Increasing the agent's bargaining power increases the information rent and decreases the corruption rent. This tradeoff exists whenever bribes are paid in equilibrium, but it is easily overlooked because the information rent is typically the dominant problem and the principal therefore always prefers to decrease the bargaining power of the agent relative to the supervisor (Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) , Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun (2010) ). The intuition is that, for an agent contemplating underreporting his productivity, the prospect of paying a large bribe to the supervisor if he is caught has an incentive effect similar to that of paying a fine to the principal, and the closer the amount of the bribe to amount of the fine the better for incentives. But this is only half the story. Yes, raising the equilibrium bribe reduces the information rent of the agent, but it also raises the corruption rent of the supervisor, and the dominance of the informational rent is not robust. The introduction of even a small difficulty for the supervisor/agent coalition in forging information ( > 0, however small) allows for the possibility that the principal may prefer to increase the bargaining power of the agent.
Relationship to the Literature
The model presented is closest to those of Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun (2010) and Vafai (2002 Vafai ( , 2005 , which consider both bribery and extortion in vertical structures with moral hazard. Vafai finds it optimal always to deter both forms of corruption. Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun find that the potential for extortion may lead to optimal bribery, but extortion is never tolerated. In the present paper, extortion-deterrence is always optimal under the respective assumptions of Vafai and Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun for two different and rather special reasons, and under more general conditions the principal may prefer to tolerate extortion and bribery both.
Traditional analyses of corruption tend not to treat the provision of incentives under asymmetric information as a central issue. 5 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) model corrupt rent-seeking behavior by public officials who sell public goods (permits or licenses, e.g.)
for private gain, taking as given the opportunities for such behavior and comparing the case of many independent oligopolist officials selling complementary goods (e.g., multiple permits from different agencies that are perfect complements in some firm's production function) with the case of a cohesive corrupt entity that monopolizes the sale of these goods.
The incentive effects of information-based corruption are only partially addressed in the literature on collusion in hierarchies started by Tirole (1986) . This literature has largely chosen to ignore extortion, purposefully adopting information structures in which bribery and collusion are relevant while extortion is not. 6 The majority of this literature studies environments in which it is optimal to deter collusion in equilibrium, although there are several notable exceptions.
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Extortion is featured in several recent agency models, but it has not been analyzed in a way that illuminates the traditional tradeoff between efficiency and information rent. 8 In contrast to these, the present paper focuses on the principal's most elemental contracting problem -designing a schedule of transfers to the agent and supervisor, contingent on the agent's performance and the supervisor's report, to maximize an objective function subject to incentive constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a familiar model with slight modifications made to highlight the effects of extortion. Section 3 presents benchmark results without corruption. Section 4 first lays out a simple, reducedform, bargaining model to describe bribery and extortion. It goes on to describe two strategic-form games that provide a foundation for the reduced-form model and impose some reasonable restrictions on the extent to which irrational threats may support 6 See, generally, Laffont and Tirole (1991) , Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) , Mookherjee and Png (1995), and Kessler (2000) . An early exception is Laffont (1990) , which studies "hidden gaming" similar to extortion. 7 See for example Che (1995) , Besley and McLaren (1993) , Khalil and Lawarrée (2006) , Kofman and Lawarrée (1996 ), Laffont and N'Guessan (1999 ), and Straub (2009 . 8 Mookherjee (1997) and Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo (1999) study tax auditing; Polinsky and Shavell (2001) analyze a problem of optimal law enforcement; Auriol (2006) studies procurement; and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) present a model of government regulation.
extortion. Section 5 rules out a number of mechanisms, setting the stage for the exposition of optimal mechanisms in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Model
The agent (A) exerts an effort that, together with a productivity parameter , determines output = + . takes one of two positive values, or , with − ≝ ∆ > 0. obtains with probability , and obtains with probability 1 − .
and are the private information of A while is publicly observable and verifiable. A's disutility of effort is ( ) = 2 2 ⁄ . The output belongs to the principal (P), who
compensates A with a transfer . 9 A maximizes his expected utility
The nature of the uncertainty will be explained below.
The supervisor (S) observes a signal ∈ { , ∅, } and makes a public report �. The correlation between and is such that Prob( = | ) = Prob( = | ) = , and
That is, S learns the true state with probability and observes nothing with probability (1 − ). S is never "wrong" in the sense that Prob( = | ) = Prob( = | ) = 0. S may be paid a wage ≥ 0, which may depend on �. 10 P designs the grand mechanism = � ( , �), ( , �)� to maximize the
We shall consider two alternative information structures: soft information and hard information, which are defined as follows: ( �| ) ∈ { , ∅, } under soft information, and ( �| ) ∈ { , ∅} under hard information. That is, any manipulation is possible when information is soft, but only the suppression of information is possible when information is hard.
Information is hard for S. If not, S is useless. 11 The assumption is also realistic for two reasons: First, when contemplating manipulations that are unfavorable to A, S would 9 This decision is inconsequential. The same results are obtained if instead A collects the output and pays taxes to P. 10 Without limited liability for S, the expected value of any bribes or extortion payments collected by S in equilibrium could be taken by the principal ex ante, and the cost of corruption would vanish. 11 The assumption that information is hard for S is standard. See for example Tirole (1986 Tirole ( , 1992 , Laffont and Tirole (1991) . Baliga (1999) shows that S may still be useful when information is soft, but relies on feel less anxiety in hiding information than in forging information. Information may be hard or soft for the S/A coalition (S/A). Specifically, information is hard for S/A with some probability . It simplifies the exposition to assume that only S/A discovers whether information is hard or soft. P knows the probability but cannot distinguish, when observing � = , between the case of = and that of = ∅, say, when information is soft.
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The timing of the game is as follows:
(1) A learns .
(2) P offers for S and A to accept or reject. If either player rejects , the game ends.
If both players accept , the game moves to date (3).
(3) A produces .
(4) S may be asked to observe and make a report �. In this case, the timing includes the following steps:
(4.1) S and A observe and learn whether information is hard or soft.
14 special assumptions. Laffont (1990) shows that the supervisor is useful if information is only sometimes soft, which would be true in the present model as well. 12 Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun also emphasize that forging evidence is a team activity, the cost of which depends on the amount of help from team members. Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) , from which the biased sampling example is taken, make a similar assumption, which in their model rules out extortion since "finding nothing" is never realized. 13 This assumption allows us to focus on key issues. Other papers have analyzed appeals processes and other sorts of external enforcement that may bring corruption to light (Mookherjee (1997), Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo (1999) , Polinksy and Shavell (2001) ). For comparison to these papers, it is worth pointing out that may be interpreted as an exogenous probability of detecting collusion (while extortion is never detected) -without changing results -if it is assumed that detection results in overturning the supervisor's report without imposing any additional penalties. 14 The assumption that both S and A observe is made for the sake of expositional simplicity. An interesting and important strand of the literature considers collusion under asymmetric information. See especially Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000) and Che and Kim (2006 
Benchmarks without corruption
It is easier to understand corruption after first considering optimal mechanisms in its absence. In particular, this will enable us to see which form of corruption, bribery or extortion, is relevant in a given state.
Second-best (no supervisor)
If either or were publicly observable, A could be paid ½ for one unit of effort regardless of type. This scheme is impractical when both and are A's private information. If the principal demands a verifiable output of 1 + from an agent of type , ∈ { , }, and pays ½ regardless of output, the high type ( ) prefers to produce 1 + by exerting = 1 − ∆ . The contract must not only compensate each type for his disutility of effort ( − 2 2 ⁄ = ≥ 0, ∈ { , }) but must also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints ≥ − ( Δ + Δ 2 2 ⁄ ), which ensures that the low type prefers to exert , and ≥ + ( Δ − Δ 2 2 ⁄ ), which ensures that the high type prefers to exert . As usual, only the participation constraint of the low type and the incentive constraint of the high type are binding at the optimum, and P's problem can be expressed as follows:
with respect to and . The optimal contract with no supervisor involves = 1, = 1 − � 1− � Δ ≝ , and
15 15 In order for the incentive constraint of the high type to be correct as written above, we require > Δ . Otherwise, the high type could costlessly mimic the low type by disposing of some of his endowment . We shall assume > Δ in order to avoid this minor difficulty. The incentive constraint of the low type and the participation constraint of the high type are slack, since 1 > > Δ > Δ 2 ⁄ . The downward distortion in the effort level of the low type is a standard result in a second-best contract. At the first-best
Free supervision without corruption
It is well-known that with correlation and unlimited penalties P can implement the first-best. See Riordan and Sappington (1988) and Crémer and McLean (1988) . With a maximum penalty, a separation result emerges (Baron and Besanko (1984) ): As maximum penalties increase, P first reduces the information rent without adjusting the second-best effort. After rent has been eliminated, further increases in maximum penalties are used to restore the effort. The standard separation result is replicated here as follows:
P is required to pay to A at least ( − ) 2 2 ⁄ = 2 2 ⁄ when output is low and at
⁄ when output is high, regardless of � (before any penalties).
Since the incentive constraint of the low type is slack at the optimum, there is no reason to employ S following high output. Since supervision is free, it is without loss of generality that P sends S with probability 1 when output is low. When � = , which occurs exclusively off the equilibrium path, P collects from A a penalty ≤ * .
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When � = ∅, P collects from A a penalty ∅ ≤ * . To compensate the low type for the risk of incurring ∅ , P pays to A a transfer that exceeds 2 2 ⁄ by an amount when
P's problem is to choose , , , , ∅ , and to maximize the surplus
, for nonnegative and , ∅ and less than * and nonnegative, and subject to the participation (or individual rationality) constraint of the low type (IR) and incentive compatibility constraint of the high type (IC), which are as follows:
level of effort, reducing the effort by a small amount involves a second-order loss of efficiency and a firstorder reduction in the information rent. See Baron and Myerson (1982) and Maskin and Riley (1984) . 16 Apologies for the abuse of notation. When P appears by itself it is the principal. A subscripted P denotes a penalty and P* is the maximum penalty.
The model is solved in Appendix A, and the results are summarized as follows: and no rent. Maximum deterrence is no longer optimal, and either ∅ or or both may be strictly less than * while still satisfying (IC) strictly. For comparison with optimal contracts presented in Section 6, it will be useful to consider what happens when the principal uses higher * to first reduce ∅ as much as (IC) will allow. With no distortion in and
, the first-best is achieved with ∅ = 0 and = ; call this regime .
We can now see that collusion is the issue when ∈ {∅, }. In either case, A would be willing to offer a bribe in order to secure � = . Extortion is not relevant because S cannot threaten unilateral action that would make A worse off relative to � = . If = ∅, no unilateral manipulation is feasible because information is hard for S. If = , � = ∅ is feasible but would never make A worse off compared to � = .
Extortion is the issue when = , and framing then involves � = ∅.
Bargaining
The side mechanism specifies a report � and a side transfer , which is paid by A to S if > 0. 17 Let us suppose to be the result of bargaining between S and A, and suppose that is determined by the solution to a static Nash bargaining program (hereafter called the axiomatic bargaining solution). 18 We shall later provide some foundation for this axiomatic approach, applying work by Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and Abreu and Gul (2000) .
Consider first the case where = ∅, when bribery is the issue. 19 Since S can only report � = ∅ without help from A, the reservation payoffs are − ∅ for A and ∅ for S. 
The side transfer is not assumed to be nonnegative. If > ∅ , both players gain by collusion, and S pays
, collusion occurs without any side transfer.
Let us next consider the case where = , when extortion is the issue. If ∅ > , framing is sequentially rational for S, absent a side mechanism. The reservation payoffs are therefore the same as in the case of bribery. The bargaining solution and the (bIR) constraints are as above, and exists with � = and
, framing is not sequentially rational. Let us consider the possibility that both players attach some probability to S carrying out the threat of framing when
That is, absent , both players expect � to be determined by (∼) the 17 As is standard, is assumed to be enforceable (Tirole (1986 (Tirole ( , 1992 ). 18 Kofman and Lawarrée (1996) and Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun (2010) also use the static Nash bargaining solution in this way. Svejnar (1986) estimates a Nash bargaining model. 19 The case where = can be ignored without loss of generality. This will be explained in Section 5. 20 The assumption of perfectly symmetric uncertainty will be relaxed later. The assumption that is unresponsive to the gap between ∅ and is too strong, but it simplifies the exposition greatly.
. In this case, the reservation payoffs
If satisfies the (bIR) constraints ( + ∅ ) ≥ and + ( − ∅ ) ≥ 0, involves � = and = . If violates the (bIR) constraints, no side mechanism can be agreed upon, and � ∼ 〈 , {∅, }〉. But we can easily see that
always satisfies the (bIR) constraints because
We have seen that fails to exist and framing occurs if and only if ∅ − > + ∅ . But this strict inequality cannot hold in equilibrium because there would then exist an > 0 such that lowering ∅ by would strictly reduce P's cost without affecting the equilibrium outcome. Therefore, we have the following proposition:
(Framing is never tolerated in equilibrium.)
Proof: Appendix B.
In Sections 5 and 6, the equilibrium bribe is denoted by ∅ * , and its value is given by the axiomatic bargaining solution:
The equilibrium extortion payment is * , and its value is also given by the axiomatic
The remainder of the section is not essential to the reader's understanding of the main results.
Foundations of the axiomatic bargaining solution
Let us now suppose that bargaining follows a Binmore-Rubinstein-Wolinsky (1986) process with exogenous risk of breakdown: S and A meet at times 0, ∆, 2∆, 3∆,…, where ∆ is the interval that elapses between meetings. At each meeting, one player proposes a side transfer for the other to accept or reject. If is accepted, A pays to S and S 21 Inclusion of the case where ∅ = with ∅ < is without loss of generality -it admits inclusion of ∅ = with ∅ > as a special case ( = 1).
reports � = . Upon rejection, the process continues. Either S or A makes the first offer (it does not matter which), and subsequent offers alternate. The duration of the bargaining process is uncertain, but it is common knowledge that the duration is distributed exponentially with parameter (although beliefs about may differ), so that the probability of the process continuing to at least ( + 1)∆ if no agreement is reached at
The players have (possibly divergent) beliefs about and also about what will happen if the process ends before an agreement is reached. When beliefs differ, the players "agree to disagree" in the sense that even divergent beliefs are common knowledge. Specifically, A's belief is Pr( = ) = 1 and Pr( = ) = 1, and S's belief is Pr( = ) = 1 and Pr( = ) = 1, where , recall, is the probability that S reports � = ∅ (framing A if = ) if the process ends without an agreement. The reservation payoff of player is the expected payoff of the lottery 〈 , {∅, }〉, = , .
All this is common knowledge.
Provided each player prefers to make an offer that the other will accept, S's proposal must satisfy (1) and A's proposal must satisfy (2):
Appealing to Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, there is a (unique) perfect equilibrium in which A always proposes * and rejects any proposal strictly greater than * , and S always proposes * and rejects any proposal strictly less than * , where * and * satisfy (1) and (2) in equality, as long as * and * (strictly) satisfy the (bIR)
constraints. That is, as long as
are satisfied in equality, both players are indifferent between playing this equilibrium and taking their reservation payoffs, and there is no loss of generality in assuming that the players reach an agreement.
In the limit as ∆ tends to zero, * and * both approach the following quantity ( * from above and * from below):
If < ∅ , framing is sequentially rational and it is natural to suppose that beliefs converge on = 1. If > ∅ , framing is irrational and S is better off if A believes that S himself believes that is rather small. The reason is that, the larger S believes to be, the more apprehensive he is about negotiations ending without an agreement. At the same time, S would like A to believe that is large. It also can be seen that beliefs < favor player , as this player is more optimistic about the chances for continued negotiation if a proposal is rejected.
If we let = = and let = � + � in (3), then this equilibrium corresponds to the axiomatic bargaining solution = {(1 − )(
bargaining yields an agreement , this agreement is unique and equivalent to that given by the axiomatic bargaining solution.
Although it is realistic to allow for some uncertainty on the part of S as to how he will behave if bargaining ends without an agreement, the assumption of perfectly symmetric uncertainty is too strong. Therefore let us consider a similar bargaining game with asymmetric information, in the spirit of the chain-store paradox (Selten (1978) , Kreps and Wilson (1982) , Milgrom and Roberts (1982) ) as it has been applied to bargaining by Abreu and Gul (2000) . S privately knows himself to be either a strategic player who never frames (unless < ∅ ) or a behavioral player who always proposes , rejects any proposal strictly less than , and always frames if the process ends without an agreement. It is common knowledge that S is the behavioral type with probability .
This game has a (unique) perfect equilibrium in which the strategic S mimics his behavioral counterpart and A always proposes ̂ and rejects any proposal strictly greater than , provided ̂≤ (<) ( + ∅ ). 22 In order for the presence of the behavioral type to yield interesting results, the behavioral type must make a reasonable demand, such that A is willing to pay ̂ with certainty rather than run the (small-) risk of ruin.
The special case of interest is that in which lim Δ→0̂= * . Naturally, this approach cannot uniquely predict the axiomatic bargaining solution, since ̂ is exogenous. Still, the case in which ̂ tends to * in the limit is especially instructive. Consider the agent's participation constraint in the limiting case. Again assuming a common value for and
By inspection, a rather large can be supported only if is sufficiently large. The extreme case in which S has all the bargaining power and can commit to carry out irrational threats is supported only if S is always the behavioral type. The strategic model thus places a reasonable upper bound on cum (1 − ) according to what one is willing to consider a reasonable value for . On the other hand, as long as one concedes the possibility of > 0, however small, one must also concede that is likely to be strictly positive whenever
Contracting responses to corruption
Definition. A contract is said to deter corruption (or to be corruption-proof) if (1) no strictly positive side payment changes hands in equilibrium and (2) � = .
One approach P may take in response to the threat of corruption is to set = ∅ = = ∅ = 0. By making contracts indifferent for � = and � = ∅, P takes away both the stake of collusion (when = ∅) and the teeth of extortion (when = ). Collusion can be costlessly deterred when = by sufficiently rewarding S for � = .
Rewarding � = does not encourage extortion, since S cannot forge � = alone, and costs P nothing, since = with zero probability in equilibrium. One subtlety is that Proof: For every contract in CP, * = ∅ * = 0, and � = without loss of generality.
23
We have seen in Section 3 that for * sufficiently large ( * ≥ ), the first-best is achieved using only and setting = ∅ = 0. We can therefore state a corollary to Lemma 1 without further proof:
Corollary. Corruption is costlessly deterred if * ≥ .
Lemma 1 and its corollary help to frame the discussion that follows. Interesting Lemma 2. If < 1, optimal corruption-proof contracts all belong to the set CP.
Proof: Appendix C.
For the special case of = 1, collusion is trivially deterred in equilibrium. If = 0
as well, then all corruption is costlessly deterred. However, with > 0, extortion can be prevented (by contracts in the complement of CP) only by setting
That is, if P wishes to deter extortion in a contract with ∅ > 0, then P must reward S sufficiently for reporting information favorable to A so that * is reduced to zero. The generalization of Lemma 2 to the case of = 1 is postponed until Section 6.
We have still to consider two (not mutually-exclusive) classes of contracts in the complement of CP that may contain optima. Contracts in either class accommodate collusion in equilibrium:
(ii) + ∅ ≥ 0 and − ∅ ≥ 0 with at least one strict inequality
Define CA (i) and CA (ii) to be the sets of (collusion-accommodating) contracts satisfying conditions (i) and (ii), respectively.
Contracts in CA (i) reward S for � = ∅ if the second inequality is strict, i.e. ∅ > (so that * = ∅ * = * ), thereby raising * but not by so much that A is unwilling to pay it.
Therefore we can expect S to report � = in equilibrium, regardless of , after obtaining * from A. Since the low type then obtains the same utility, net of * , regardless of , no reward for the low type can be put beyond the reach of a deviant high type. Therefore it seems unlikely that an optimal contract would ever involve ∅ > . If ∅ = then surely both should equal zero, and we can state the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Optimal contracts satisfying the conditions (i) involve ∅ = = 0.
Proof: Appendix D.
Lemma 3 allows us to restrict attention to CA (ii) , by telling us that all contracts of interest in CA (i) also belong to CA (ii) . Contracts in CA (ii) reward S for � = if the second inequality is strict (so that > ∅ and hence * = ∅ * ), thereby lowering both * and ∅ * . In this case, we would expect that ∅ = 0 (proved in Appendix E). We can therefore restrict attention to the union of CP and the subset of CA (ii) for which ∅ = 0.
Lemma 4. Define CA to be the subset of CA (ii) for which ∅ = 0. Then, with CP defined above, optimal contracts belong to ∪ .
Proof: Since + ∅ ≥ ∅ − according to Proposition 1, and ≥ ∅ according to Lemmas 2 and 3, it remains only to show that ≥ ∅ ⇒ ∅ = 0. This is proved in Appendix E.
Optimal mechanisms with corruption
According to Lemma 4, we can restrict our search for optima to the set ∪ .
Moreover, regardless of the set to which the optimal contract belongs, we can assume without loss of generality that � = whenever = and � = ∅ with probability (and � = with probability 1 − ) when = ∅. The reasoning is as follows: We know that in equilibrium under a contract collusion occurs with probability 1 − whenever = ∅. We know also that, although extortion occurs when = , framing never occurs.
Finally we know that, although no corruption occurs in equilibrium under a contract, it would make no difference to any player, including the principal, if it did occur, since
Therefore the expected utility of the low type in equilibrium is ( − * ) +
(1 − ) �(1 − )� − ∅ * � − ∅ �, and the expected utility of the high type when he produces low output is
P's problem is to choose , , , , ∅ , , and to maximize the surplus
for nonnegative efforts, , , and , ∅ and nonnegative and less than * , and subject to the individual rationality constraint of the low type (IR) and incentive compatibility constraint of the high type (IC):
We are now ready to generalize Lemma 2 for all and , excepting only the trivial case of = 1 − = 0. The interesting result is that incentive payments to supervisors are never optimal (except for , which is not paid in equilibrium), and therefore all optimal corruption-proof contracts belong to .
Lemma 5. = 0 without loss of generality.
Proof: Appendix E.
To see this, first notice (looking at the objective function) that P's total cost exceeds the direct cost of effort by
The second term is easily recognized as the standard information rent. Since (IR) binds, the first term cannot go to A. It goes instead to S. Let us call this a corruption rent.
Feeding in (IR) and (IC), the corruption rent paid to S is
and the information rent is
where = (1 − + ) + (1 − )(1 − ). From this it is plain to see that increasing strictly raises the corruption rent whenever < 1 (vanishing from this term when = 1) and strictly raises the information rent whenever
Although for completely hard information ( = 1), vanishes from the information rent, does not vanish from the corruption rent unless = 1. The intuition is that a dollar's worth of reward reduces by only a fraction of a dollar if < 1. When = 1, vanishes from both rents and any value for is optimal, hence the proviso in the Lemma.
Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun find that it is possible to rank extortion above bribery as the greater evil, and therefore while bribery may be tolerated in equilibrium extortion never is. The reasoning is that equilibrium bribes enter the (IC) in a helpful wayimposing an extra cost on the high type who would mimic -while extortion payments only enter the (IR) -imposing a useless extra cost on the low type for which he must be compensated. Although this intuition remains valid, Proposition 2 shows that the two forms of corruption are not so easily separated in general.
Proposition 2. Suppose > 0, < 1, and < 1. Bribery occurs in equilibrium if and only if extortion does also.
Proof: (if) If extortion occurs in equilibrium, the optimal contract must belong to . But then bribery cannot be deterred since < 1 and = ∅ = 0. (only if) If bribery occurs in equilibrium, the optimal contract must belong to . But then extortion cannot be deterred since > 0, < 1, and = ∅ = 0. ∎ If = 1, any value for is optimal, and equilibrium bribes and extortion payments both can be reduced to zero by setting
contract. In this case, collusion still occurs when = ∅ and information is soft for S/A, but the equilibrium bribe is zero because players' gains are in exact proportion to their respective bargaining power. If = 0, extortion is deterred in the sense that * = 0 always. The result (Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun) that extortion is never tolerated in equilibrium seems to be limited to this special case. However, the result may be resurrected if is a decreasing function of − ∅ (S is less likely to carry out a threat, the greater the sacrifice required to do so). Proposition 3 describes optimal mechanisms, showing that bribery and extortion may coexist in equilibrium. Optimal mechanisms are divided into three corruptionaccommodating regimes and three corruption-proof regimes, including the first-best.
Regimes described as "zero-rent" involve zero information rent. The corruption rent is strictly positive in all corruption-accommodating regimes. ( )-first-best. For * > the optimal contract is the first-best of Section 3.
Proof: Appendix E. Figure 1 shows optimal regimes in the space ( , * ). The separation result (Baron and Besanko (1984) ) holds in the present model. As long as the information rent is strictly positive, remains at the second-best level. After the information rent has been eliminated, larger maximum penalties are used to restore the effort. When corruption is accommodated, maximum deterrence is optimal when the information rent is strictly positive ( * ) and at first as effort is being restored ( * ), but non-maximum deterrence is optimal for larger values of * ( ∅ ). 25 In the benchmark with free supervision without corruption, maximum deterrence was always optimal, up to the point where the first-best could be achieved. The difference is that using ∅ is now costly because of the corruption rent, which is strictly positive whenever ∅ > 0. Kofman and Lawarrée (1993) obtain a similar result in a model in which supervision is prone to error. In their model, the supervisor's mistakes, in combination with the need to pay the supervisor to prevent collusion, make it costly to use very large penalties. It is important to understand just how similar these results are: Incentive payments that prevent collusion are appropriately viewed as corruption rents. The 25 The principle of maximum deterrence was introduced by Becker (1968) . Bolton (1987) provides a formal analysis.
difference is that they are paid directly to the supervisor as specified in the contract, while in the present model corruption rents are paid indirectly through illicit bribes and extortion payments. The consequence is the same whether corruption rents are paid directly or indirectly: In the presence of corruption rents, as maximum penalties increase, maximum deterrence ceases to be optimal before the first-best is achieved.
If the results of the present model share much in common with those of Kofman and Lawarrée, Figure 1 illustrates two striking differences. First, the principal stops using ∅ altogether if * is sufficiently large, and, for still larger * , the first-best is achieved.
Remember that supervision is not prone to error, only to failure, and therefore = occurs only off the equilibrium path. Therefore is never collected -and is never paid -in equilibrium. 26 As * becomes large, the (costless) threat of becomes more effective and the principal relies less on the costly ∅ . For * sufficiently large, the firstbest is implemented with ∅ = 0, as we saw in Section 3. Second, corruption is not tolerated if is too small (as usual) but now also if is too large. The reason that the supervisor is ignored (unless � = ) when is large is due to the extortion component of the corruption rent. In equilibrium, S receives a bribe with probability (1 − ) and receives an extortion payment with probability . Thus, increasing increases the cost of extortion and decreases the cost of bribery, and the net effect may be to increase the total corruption rent if is rather large and is rather small. The higher are extortion payments in equilibrium, the larger is the gap between and 1 (the gap vanishes if = 0). The tolerance region is responsive not only to , but also to and , as summarized by Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The tolerance region strictly expands as increases, as decreases, and as increases, except in the following special cases: (a) If = 0, the tolerance 26 Recall that in Section 5 we fixed = + . With Lemma 1, we were able to see that this was without loss of generality for corruption-proof contracts. We can easily see that there is also no loss of generality for corruption-accommodating contracts: The coalition obtains a total payoff of if � = , − ∅ if � = ∅, and
Since the coalition is indifferent between reporting � = and � = (and strictly prefers either to reporting � = ∅) it is without loss of generality that no collusion occurs when = and collusion leads to � = when = ∅. But if = 1 and = 0 then = ∞. Here is good reason to think that this set of assumptions may be too extreme. By the time S succeeds in establishing such a formidable reputation in negotiations (arguably no mean feat), S has long since conceded all of the corruption rents associated with corruption-accommodating contracts, because P has long since ceased to tolerate corruption.
Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun (2010) find that the principal unambiguously prefers to lower . In their model, information is soft for S/A ( = 0). According to Proposition 4, the principal may prefer to raise if > 0. To see this, fix parameters such that the optimal contract is 0 ∈ for some 0 and ′ ∈ for some ′ > 0 . Since outcomes implemented by contracts in are indifferent to , ′ must be preferred to 0 .
The remainder of the section analyzes a new tradeoff, with respect to , between the information rent and the corruption rent. Increasing raises the information rent and reduces the corruption rent, and the overall effect on the principal's welfare is ambiguous: Under stronger institutions (higher , , and * ) the principal prefers strong agents, and under weaker institutions the principal prefers strong supervisors.
Recall (from (4) and (5), now with = 0) that the information rent is
� ∅ − � and the corruption rent is Increasing is easily seen to reduce and thereby increase both rents. Increasing can be seen to reduce both rents (strictly as long as 0 < < 1) as follows:
The changes in and ℐ with respect to are as follows:
It can be seen that increasing α reduces the corruption rent at the cost of raising the information rent. The net effect of increasing is strictly rent-reducing if and only if the following condition (7) is satisfied in a regime.
.
Condition (7) is very intuitive at a high level: Since the information rent is paid with probability 1 − and the corruption rent is paid with probability , it is natural that reducing the corruption rent is the more urgent problem when is rather large. Recall that corruption-accommodating regimes are optimal for
Hence, a necessary condition for the existence of equilibria in which strictly lowers rent is that the right-hand side of (7) strictly exceed , which is equivalent to > 0.
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Before considering the general case in which both and are strictly positive, some initial insight can be gleaned from the following three special cases:
27 It can be seen that is independent of if = 1, and the inequality is then not strict even for < 1.
28 As long as we are not in the special case of Proposition 1.1.c (where = 1 − = 0 and corruption is never tolerated), the right hand side of (7) First, when = = 0, then (when ∅ > 0) the net effect of is rent-reducing only for 1− < 1 , but it is optimal to set ∅ > 0 only for 1− >
1
. Hence appears to always be rent-increasing. Indeed, is always rent-increasing, but only because it is never optimal to set ∅ > 0 in the region where, if you did have ∅ > 0, would be rentreducing.
Second, the same is true if > = 0: When ∅ > 0, the net effect of is rent-
, and it is optimal to set ∅ > 0 for
Hence, again, is never rent-reducing in equilibrium.
Third and finally, suppose > = 0. When ∅ > 0, the net effect of is rent-
� > (1 − ) and so now the effect of depends on . Since
is decreasing in , is rent-reducing for low and rent-increasing for high as long as
, is always rent-increasing. . that increasing lowers rent, after which further hardening strengthens the rent-reducing effect of .
30
Figure 2. The rent-reducing direction of
There are essentially two institutional weaknesses through which corruption gives rise to rent: (through which extortion in equilibrium contributes to rent) and 1 − (through which collusion in equilibrium contributes to rent). 31 The relationship between 30 It is even possible, for low starting levels of and 1− < 1− (1− )
(1− )(1− )
, to first see benefits of higher attenuate and vanish as increases, only to reemerge for sufficiently high . 31 It has been pointed out that corruption is toothless if both = 0 and = 1. It is understood that extortion has bite even if = 0. The lesson of Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun is exactly that: The potential for extortion is what leads to collusion in equilibrium, even if extortion does not itself produce strictly positive
and rent -and the subtle way in which affects this relationship -can be explained by the relative magnitudes of these two weaknesses.
First observe that increasing increases , and hence decreases both rentsthrough a term (the extortion rent effect), and through a term (1 − )(1 − ) (the collusion rent effect). Next observe that appears as a multiplier in a penalty-reducing (hence rent-increasing) term of the information rent, (1 − )(1 − )⁄ (the direct information rent effect). Notice that the direct information rent effect is tempered by the two rent-reducing effects that operate through .
Only the rent-reducing effects apply to the corruption rent, which is therefore decreasing in . The direct information rent effect overpowers the two rent-reducing effects in the information rent, which is therefore increasing in . The net effect of may be either to increase or decrease total rent, as shown in Figure 2 . Moreover, as long as > 0, the extortion rent effect persists as eventually drives out the collusion rent and direct information rent effects, hence for sufficiently high the net effect of is to reduce rent. However, it is also possible for to be rent-reducing for sufficiently low, because when (1 − ) is large the collusion rent effect is large and the direct information rent effect, while larger for (1 − ) in the numerator, is tempered by larger in the denominator.
Increasing weakens both the collusion rent effect and the direct information rent effect. However, when (1 − ) is large relative to , so that works more through the collusion rent effect in , increasing does relatively less to weaken the information rent effect (through which hurts) and does relatively more to weaken the collusion rent effect (through which helps), with the result that becomes less helpful or more unhelpful as increases. When instead (1 − ) is small relative to , so that works more through the extortion rent effect in , increasing does relatively more to weaken side transfers. If = 1 and > 0, extortion payments (and thus corruption rents) are strictly positive although collusion is infeasible.
the information rent effect and does relatively less to weaken the collusion rent effect, and becomes less unhelpful or more helpful as increases.
32 Figure 3 shows the effect of on the shape of the right hand side of (7) -the U in the bottom panel of Figure 2 . Lower accuracy in the supervision technology (smaller ) tends to enlarge the region where rent is increasing in . Increasing can be seen to have an effect similar to that of increasing : We move from inside the U where is harmful to right of the U where is helpful either by moving eastward while the U holds still or by staying put while the U rises to the left. Figure 3 . Right hand side of (7) for various Under * and ∅ , the tradeoff with respect to between informational and corruption rents no longer exists (since information rent is eliminated). However, under * there is still a tradeoff with respect to between rent and efficiency: Both corruption rent and are decreasing with respect to . Under ∅ , where maximum deterrence is no longer optimal, the tradeoff disappears, and is increasing (and the principal's welfare is unambiguously increasing) with respect to .
32 Most of the foregoing results are robust to an alternative construction of hard information in which enters only (IC) and not (IR), as if forging evidence of low type is made more difficult for S/A only if A's type is actually high. It can be shown that increasing can only make less unhelpful (when is rentincreasing for low ) or more helpful (when is rent-reducing for high or for < /(1 − )). Simply put, the bottom of the U sits at = 0. Details are available from the author. 
Conclusion
The paper yields the novel insight, stemming from the tradeoff, with respect to bargaining power, between informational and corruption rents, that the principal's welfare may actually increase with the bargaining power of the agent. This is the case when maximum penalties (analogous to outside opportunities) are high or when supervision is more accurate and yields information that is less easily manipulated. The more general lesson is that stronger institutions favor strong agents while weaker 33 Maximum penalties might be lower in the absence of institutions that facilitate the seizure of assets and the garnishing of wages. For that matter, people in developing economies have fewer assets to seize and lower wages to garnish (although these shortcomings may create demand for harsh non-monetary penalties). Raising the maximum penalty has essentially the same effect as raising the reservation utility of the agent -to allow the principal to rely more heavily on and less on ∅ , which lessens the bite of corruption since collusion is costlessly prevented when = and � = cannot be forged. See Khalil, Lawarrée, and Yun (2010) . 34 Both the UNODC and Transparency International studies cited in the introduction highlight widespread pessimism regarding governments' effectiveness at combating corruption by such means. 35 India's Right to Information Law might be viewed as an example of one such policy. If so, it highlights the potential to harden information by astonishingly simple means: Polgreen (2010) reports that "India's 1.2 billion citizens have been newly empowered by the far-reaching law granting them the right to demand almost any information from the government [, which has] clearly begun to tilt the balance of power, long skewed toward bureaucrats and politicians." institutions favor strong supervisors. When monitoring is less sophisticated (less accurate and yielding information that is more easily manipulated) and maximum penalties are low, larger side transfers are actually preferred and policies aimed at checking the ability of supervisors to extract such transfers are likely to be less in demand. The mandate to restrain supervisors' rent-seeking does not arise until monitoring technology is sufficiently advanced or penalties are sufficiently large. Several strong assumptions were made in order to model bargaining in an informative way, and many important aspects of anticorruption policy (such as appeals processes, competition among supervisors, and efficiency wages, to name just a few) were set aside in order to focus on a few key ideas. The present framework is therefore but a step toward a more general theory of information-based corruption.
36 Svejnar (1986) emphasizes this issue as well: "It must be stressed that (some of) the same exogenous factors may affect bargaining power as well as the threat point (disagreement outcome) and that this simultaneous effect does not obviate the need for the concept of bargaining power […] . Suppose that a nonunion wage serves as the union's threat point and that the legalization of a closed shop (or the right to strike) affects the nonunion wage through threat or spillover effects. It is quite likely that this change in the legal environment also affects the union's bargaining power, i.e. its ability to realize a gain over and above the threat point. It is for instance quite possible that even if the nonunion wage rises, the union-nonunion wage differential increases as well, ceteris paribus. Accounting properly for movements in the threat point is hence important, but it may not be sufficient for identifying changes in the division of the subject of bargaining that occur above the threat point." (F) must be satisfied for framing to occur in equilibrium, hence collusion is deterred.
(IR) requires ∅ = 0 and P's problem can be rewritten: (CP) cannot be strict without leading to framing, which is ruled out by Proposition 1.
Therefore (CP) implies * = + ∅ , hence (IR) requires ∅ = 0.
With ∅ = 0 and = ∅ − , P's problem can be rewritten: 
